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CARNEADES' CLASSIFICATION  
OF ETHICAL THEORIES

Our fullest source for Carneades' "division" or classification of ethical theories<sup>1</sup> is Cicero, and it is natural to wonder what is happening in this particular transition from Greece to Rome. Our understanding of Carneades' division of ethical theories has been greatly improved in recent years by the work of Carlos Lévy and Keimpe Algra<sup>2</sup>, but something, I hope, remains to be said.

The classification has some striking features. Some of the positions it puts forward are untenanted; in the fullest version of it, in *De finibus* v 16-23, no fewer than three of the nine positions established have no actual defender. Carneades, we are told, defended one of them for the sake of argument. Moreover, many of the named defenders are philosophers who are utterly obscure; Calliphon, Deinomachus, Diodorus and Hieronymus are known chiefly for their appearances in the classification. It is unlikely that Carneades picked them because of more robust fame which has since been lost to us. Moreover, these obscure philosophers hold central positions in a framework where Epicurus and the Stoa have a more problematic placement. And Carneades produced his classifi-

<sup>1</sup> Strictly, it is a classification of ethical ends, ethical theories being individuated by their final ends. Note that by distinguishing pleasure and freedom from pain as distinct ends the classification makes it inevitable that Epicurus' theory will turn out to be confused.

<sup>2</sup> C. LÉVY, *Cicero Academicus*, ("Collection de l'École française de Rome" 162), Roma 1992; K. ALGRA, *Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero: the Ethical 'divisiones' in Cicero's 'Lucullus'*, in B. INWOOD, J. MANSFELD (eds.), *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Hellenisticum*, Leiden 1995, pp. 107-39.

cation, we are told, after surveying not only what philosophical positions there had actually been about our final good, but “all those that could possibly be propounded”<sup>3</sup>.

The classification is reasonably to be seen not as a gathering of established theories<sup>4</sup>, but rather as a theoretically based framework, where Carneades filled important gaps, arguing for the position that our final good is to enjoy the primary natural advantages because, presumably, it was important to discuss it, but it had no owner; elsewhere we find that he also argued forcefully for Calliphon’s position – presumably because the existing arguments for it were feeble<sup>5</sup>.

Our fullest source, and the only one where the classification is ascribed to Carneades by name, is *De finibus* v 16-23. This is the passage where we are told that Antiochus freely used the classification (16), and it is reasonable to wonder whether we might be dealing with a presentation of it which has been affected by Antiochus’ use of it.

Carneades begins (16) with a claim about any *ars*, skill or branch of knowledge. Any skill must have an object distinct from itself, as medicine and navigation do; similarly *prudentia*,

<sup>3</sup> *De fin.* v 16: *non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae.* I use R. Woolf’s translation in R. WOOLF, *Cicero, On Moral Ends*, Cambridge 2001. There is a problem here, pointed out to me by Jonathan Barnes, one common to any interpretation. The classification, as will be shown, comes up with the possible, not just actual, positions that result, given certain naturalistic assumptions commonly shared in Hellenistic debate and plausibly to be seen as the assumptions Carneades could presuppose in debate. This is, however, short of an exhaustive classification of all possible theories, a point that turns out to be important for the later history of the classification.

<sup>4</sup> As K. ALGRA, *Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero*, cit., convincingly establishes.

<sup>5</sup> *Luc.* 139. Carneades is said to have defended this position so forcefully that he was taken to accept it himself; here Cicero appeals to Clitomachus’ declaration that he had no idea what Carneades accepted.

practical reasoning, which is the skill of living, must “have as its basis and starting-point something external”<sup>6</sup>. Cicero’s spokesperson for Antiochus, Piso, goes on to say that what practical reasoning is concerned with and aims to attain must be “something that is well suited and adapted to our nature, something that is attractive in itself and capable of arousing our desire (what the Greeks call *horme*)”. This is where dispute sets in, which it is important to resolve, since “The origins of the whole dispute about the highest goods and evils, and the question of what among them is ultimate and final, is to be found by asking what the basic natural attachments are. Discover these, and you have the source from which the rest of the debate about the supreme good and evil can be traced”.

It is taken to be assumed on all hands that we appeal to nature to find the starting-points of ethical development (a point repeated at 23). Three ends are put forward: pleasure, freedom from pain and primary natural advantages, *prima secundum naturam*. They are ends which are taken as its object by practical reasoning, but which naturally attract or repel in themselves, *per se*, without yet being recommended by reason; they can be called primary ends<sup>7</sup>.

Reason is moved, at 19, to reflect about its object, and

<sup>6</sup> It is significant that the examples of skill mentioned here, medicine and navigation, are rejected in favour of performance skills in Cato’s exposition of the Stoic theory at III 24-5. Cf. C. LÉVY, *Cicero Academicus*, cit., pp. 354-5.

<sup>7</sup> As has been noted, the *prima secundum naturam* here include “sparks and seeds of the virtues”, paving the way for Antiochus’ kind of theory, in contrast to Stoic accounts which limit them to pre-rational goods. See Cicero. *De finibus bonorum et malorum libri v*, ed. N. MADVIG, Hildesheim 1965, Excursus IV. G. MAGNALDI, *L’oikeiosis’ peripatetica in Ario Didimo e nel “De finibus” di Cicerone*, Firenze 1991, pp. 25-7, thinks that Carneades in his classification may have deliberately ignored the differences between Stoic and Peripatetic accounts on this point, emphasising the unity of their starting-points to accentuate the differences between their final ends.

from this is developed a "theory of what is right and moral", *recti...ratio atque honesti*. This is understood in terms of what the agent thinks he should do (*officium*) or pursue as his aim in acting (*facere omnia...causa*). Three theories hold that one should obtain the three primary ends; these are the theories of Aristippus, Hieronymus and "Carneades" (as I shall call Carneades defending a position for the sake of the argument). Three theories hold that one should pursue as one's aim one of the three primary ends, even if one fails to obtain it. Of these three only one is defended: the Stoics think that we should do everything to obtain primary natural advantages, even if we don't get them, and this is what they take morality to be; as such, it is the only good and the only thing to be sought for in its own right.

Three combined ends are now introduced as ends in which morality, *honestas*, figures; since this must be combined with one or other of the primary ends, we find morality combined with pleasure by Calliphon and Deinomachus, with freedom from pain by Diodorus and with primary natural advantages by the Old Academy. We thus get nine options in all. The notion of combination involved is not explicated here, but it is notable that, since the combined ends each contain a primary end, the assumption is being made that in these theories pleasure, freedom from pain and primary natural advantages are not just the starting-points for ethical development, but form part of our final end as rationally developed beings. (I am using "contain" and "part of" very generally, in a way intended to cover different ways in which a primary end might be thought to be a constituent in a final end).

We now find<sup>8</sup> Pyrrho, Ariston and Erillus brought in only to be dismissed from consideration. Here and elsewhere we

<sup>8</sup> After a slightly puzzling reference to Democritus, whose theory is later (87-8) said to be unsystematic.

find them ruled out on the grounds that nobody takes their theories seriously any more; I shall reflect this view of their status by referring to this group as "the non-starters". Here we find a reason given for why they are not taken seriously: they deny, allegedly, that we have any basis for discriminating among objects which are not morally good or bad<sup>9</sup>. This amounts to denying even the weak form of naturalist assumption that we started from, namely that there are primary objects of our natural attraction and repulsion.

This passage is the fullest account we have of Carneades' classification, but in one way it is puzzling. Elsewhere in Cicero we do not find the nine ends produced here. We find what I shall call "the six options", the three primary ends and the three ends resulting when each of these is combined with morality; and Stoicism comes in as a seventh. Now, as Algra has suggested, we can easily explain this situation by supposing that on other occasions Cicero leaves out the two merely theoretical constructs, which, since undefended in fact, would not need consideration in the actual argumentative contexts where Cicero puts the classification to use. We could therefore consider the classification as giving us either seven or nine options indifferently<sup>10</sup>.

However, as Gisela Striker pointed out clearly some time ago, there are other problems with the three further options

<sup>9</sup> I shall not here discuss the issue of how fair or unfair this characterization is.

<sup>10</sup> K. ALGRA, *Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero*, cit., pp. 127-8 and n. 52. It is worth noting that the procedure that produces either nine or seven options is not, on the evidence of the *De finibus* v passage, very easily to be seen as a *divisio* or *diairesis* if that is taken to be a dichotomous division. (This was pointed out to me by Jonathan Barnes.) From that passage, however, we cannot assume that Carneades himself called his procedure a division, and if he did he may have used the term loosely. I have used the word "classification" rather than "division" because of this issue.

introduced in *De finibus* v<sup>11</sup>. Carneades' classification is introduced as a classification of candidates for being our final end, yet begins abruptly with practical reasoning and its goals. Moreover, practical reasoning reflects on the primary ends in a way which discerns our final end to be something distinct from them, in a way which is true only of the Stoic theory; no wonder the other two options find themselves without defenders<sup>12</sup>. Further, morality is here introduced as the result of practical reasoning's taking the primary ends as material for reflection. Yet when we get to the combined ends morality is introduced in another way, as something to be "joined" or "combined" with the primary ends to produce a specification of our final end. This awkwardness shows up in the way that at the end of the account the Stoics, whose end when introduced did not contain a primary end (since it is said to consist in pursuing natural advantages even without achieving them) are reintroduced as people who in fact (despite their terminology) defend the third combined end, allegedly held by the "Old Academy" in a verbally different form.

Of course, both of the ways in which the Stoics are introduced here have parallels elsewhere. The idea that our end consists in pursuing primary natural advantages in a certain

<sup>11</sup> G. STRIKER, *Antipater, or the Art of Living*, in EAD., *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 200-2 and n. 16.

<sup>12</sup> And, as Gretchen Reydams-Schils has pointed out to me, in 19 and 20, in the account of the Stoic view as pursuing even without attainment, the things that are *secundum naturam* are not said to be *prima*, as they are in all versions that feature attainment of them. This may not matter if, as argued by B. INWOOD, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism*, Oxford 1985, Appendix 1, "primary" for the early Stoics indicated a natural thing with respect to which other natural things are said to be natural, while the idea of temporal primacy may have been introduced later, perhaps by Carneades' classification itself. If so, we would have a carelessness in the classification here (or in Cicero's use of it) rather than the Stoic view itself being represented awkwardly or incorrectly.

way, even if we do not get them, is analogous to some of the accounts of the Stoic final end, particularly those of Diogenes and Antipater<sup>13</sup>. And the idea that the Stoic final end is virtue, in some relation to primary natural advantages, is the subject of discussion in *De finibus* books III-v. However, the way the two accounts of the Stoic theory are combined in this passage is striking and perplexing. It is tempting to agree with Striker that "the argument about the art of living is on the one hand presumably truncated, while on the other hand the classification has become incomprehensible"<sup>14</sup>.

If we attend to the difficulties that Striker emphasises, we may be inclined to think that the relation between *De finibus* v and the other appearances of the classification is quite problematic; we may not just have a fuller classification in v which is shortened elsewhere. Even if the introduction of the three further ends came from Carneades rather than Antiochus or Cicero (and we can only speculate about this) it is undeniably awkward. Perhaps the version we find elsewhere<sup>15</sup>, with the six options plus the Stoic theory, was an alternative form of the classification, where the Stoic theory was added as a seventh theory without an attempt to relate it to the six options.

It seems to me that the only ground we have for deciding between this possibility and the view that we are dealing with longer and shorter versions of the same classification is a philosophical one, namely the awkwardness of the book v

<sup>13</sup> Ar. Did. *apud* Stob. *eccl.* II 6a.

<sup>14</sup> G. STRIKER, *Antipater*, cit., p. 312. In n. 20 she regards this modification of Carneades' classification as a mistake, probably by Antiochus or Cicero. Her present position is that it is also possible that it could be a modification by Carneades himself, to stress the outlying nature of the Stoic theory.

<sup>15</sup> Elsewhere in Cicero; in the [Archytas'] passage I shall be discussing we find a (problematic) version of Carneades' options plus a further, non-Stoic theory.

passage. It may also seem that not much can hinge on which we prefer, since in either case what we find elsewhere is the Stoic theory plus the six options. I agree that we have no decisive reason to say that we have two classifications rather than longer and shorter versions of the same classification; but the awkwardness of the *De finibus* v passage, and its mention of Antiochus, is worth noting.

As both Algra and Lévy have emphasised, the classification in Cicero turns up in different argumentative contexts. How, though, can a classification help an *argument*? I suggest that, if we look at the classification's different uses in Cicero, we can distinguish two ways in which it is used (although, since the evidence is nearly all from Cicero, we should bear in mind that we can only speculate as to the extent to which Cicero is innovating or reflecting a distinction found in his sources). In the first kind of use, it is employed in what can be reasonably regarded as a form of sceptical argument. If we look at the classification's use in *De finibus* III-IV, *De finibus* II, the end of *Lucullus* and *Tusculanae Disputationes* V, we shall find that, in three different ways, the classification is used in arguments against different theories, from different starting-points, without commitment to any of them – a familiar form of sceptical arguing. In the second way that the classification is used, all the theories classified but one are eliminated, supporting the favoured one, in relation to which the user of the argument appears committed rather than sceptically detached. This second use is, I suggest, what we find in *De finibus* V. We find it also in a non-Ciceronian passage, the end of [Archytas'] *Ethical Education* (I shall use [Archytas] to refer to the author writing as Archytas in the pseudo-Pythagorean ethical writings.). I suggest, tentatively, that the committed use in Antiochus and [Archytas] may help us see how the classification degenerated from its use in sceptical argument to its use as a list in doxographies.

I shall first look at the classification's use in *De finibus* III

and IV. Book III begins with an exchange between Cicero and the Stoic spokesperson Cato in which Cicero begins (10-3) by claiming that Stoicism is caught in a dilemma: either it is merely verbally distinct from the Peripatetic account, or, in claiming that only virtue is good, the Stoics are stuck with the position of the non-starters: virtue being the only good, there is no basis for rational discrimination among things other than virtue.

Cato's account of the Stoic theory is designed to show that this familiar dilemma fails. His account of *oikeiosis*, from 16 following, culminates in an account of the Stoic final end which shows how virtue is distinct from our original objects of pursuit, without this giving us two final ends (22). From 27 to 30 we find three brief Stoic arguments put forward to support what has been argued. The first argues from the two premises "whatever is good is praiseworthy" and "whatever is praiseworthy is moral" that "whatever is good is moral"<sup>16</sup>. It is only the first premise which gets challenged, Cato claims, but "it would be the height of absurdity for there to be a good that should not be sought; or something to be sought which was not pleasing, or pleasing but not worthy of choice, and so also commendable, and so also praiseworthy; but then it is moral"<sup>17</sup>. The second argument, at 28, is that the happy life must be a life one can be proud of; but this is true only of the moral life. The third argument (29) claims that no disposition can truly be virtue unless it holds that only immorality, and not pain and death, is evil.

It is in this context that Carneades' classification is introduced. The six options are quickly dismissed without separate

<sup>16</sup> 27: *Concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic: quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*: *Illud autem perabsurdum, bonum esse aliquid quod non expetendum sit, aut expetendum quod non placens, aut, si id, non etiam diligendum; ergo et probandum; ita autem laudabile; id autem honestum.*

engagement with them, on the general grounds that they fail to mention virtue or think it inadequate as our final end without some addition. The only views Cato takes seriously are those which locate our final end “in the mind and in virtue”. He rejects views which take our final end to be knowledge alone, or indifference to anything but virtue – the alleged positions of the non-starters Erillus and Ariston. He also rejects the Academic view, which here perhaps replaces Pyrrho, taken to be irrelevant. The right view emerges as the mainstream Stoic one, characterized by three familiar definitions<sup>18</sup>.

Why does Cato so much as mention the six options? He does not need to bring them in in order to distinguish the mainstream Stoic view from those of the non-starters. Further, he thinks all six options indefensible; here the Stoic theory is distinguished from them in the sharpest way. That theory has, after all, been introduced in a way which heavily underlines the crucial shift of perspective from pursuing primary natural advantages as goods to regarding them as preferred indifferents, and pursuing only virtue as good. Stoic theory has thus been introduced in a way which rejects the strong naturalistic assumption behind the six options, namely the assumption that primary natural advantages are not only the starting-points for our ethical development but must also form part of our final end as developed ethical beings. The presentation of the Stoic view here in the context of Carneades’ classification emphasises its position as distinctively different from the six options, seeing this as an advantage. Stoic theory (unlike the six options) claims that rational pursuit of our final end detaches us at some point from our initial pursuit of primary natural advantages; yet (unlike the non-starters) it still permits us to discriminate rationally among them.

<sup>18</sup> *De fin.* III 30-1.

The argument in *De finibus* IV is devoted to showing that Stoicism, in Cato’s account, has not escaped the original dilemma. Cicero presents the Stoics as dissenting for no good reason from the alleged original “Old Academy” view; this is briefly presented here (16-8) with the progression of *oikeiosis* greatly attenuating our attachment to primary natural advantages, but without the Stoic move which denies them a place in our final end. The special position which the Stoics give to virtue, recognizing a kind of value distinct from that of other things, now to be seen as indifferent rather than good, is dismissed in various ways. It is presented as being either a merely verbal matter, or, if taken seriously, as landing the Stoics with the position of the non-starters. From 41 onwards we find an attempt to show that the Stoics have a problem in holding both that virtue is the only good and that we can rationally discriminate among primary natural advantages.

At 48-53 we return to the three arguments of III 27-30 (the third is slightly delayed)<sup>19</sup>. The first is ridiculed on the grounds that its first premise, “Everything good is praiseworthy” is accepted only by the non-starters, whose views are rejected by mainstream Stoics. It is rejected by a number of other philosophers, we are told – and we find that they are the defenders of the six options. Epicurus, Hieronymus and “Carneades” defend the primary ends; Calliphon, Diodorus and “Aristotle, Xenocrates and the like” the combined ends.

What of the claim that the happy life must be a life one can be proud of, while this is true only of the moral life? Polemo, we are told, could perfectly well accept this, along with the rest of “that tribe”, the “Old Academy”; but this does not produce the distinctive Stoic conclusion that only virtue is good. The same holds for defenders of other com-

<sup>19</sup> Cicero is also here attacking what he sees as Stoic method, a focus on academic argument rather than directly engaging with the listener in such a way as to make a difference in her life.

bined goods. "Moreover, those whose supreme good does not include virtue will probably not concede that the happy life is something which we might justly take pride in" (51). Although they are not listed, the six options seem still to be in view. With the claim that virtue requires the thought that pain and death are not evils Cicero claims in 52-3 that everyone will readily agree that pain is "a tough, unpleasant burden", but will be perplexed by the distinctive Stoic claim that it is not an evil, because not immoral.

In general (52) "you [Cato] are helping yourself to points that either have not been agreed, or have been agreed but are no use to you". The people whose agreement is in question here are the proponents of the six options. If they understand a crucial Stoic premise in such a way that they agree that they share it, it does not suffice to lead to the distinctively Stoic conclusion. If they understand it in the distinctively Stoic way in which it does, they do not agree that they share it.

Why is this an *objection* here? The Stoic theory has been presented in book III in a way which underlined its *distinctness* from the non-starters on the one hand and all the six options on the other. Why should Cato regard his position as *refuted* here by the point that neither the non-starters nor the defenders of the six options share his premises in a form that leads to his conclusions?

The answer emerges from Cicero's whole approach in *De finibus* IV. The Stoics share with the defenders of the six options the weaker form of naturalist claim, that ethical theory begins from our attraction to primary natural advantages. Theories which reject this are treated as non-starters. Only the Stoics, however, reject the stronger assumption that the six options share, that primary natural advantages also form part of our final end as rationally developed beings.

So if a Stoic were to object that he precisely would not expect the defenders of the six options to share his premises about virtue and happiness, the response would presumably

be along the lines of the argument of Book IV generally, namely: if a Stoic is happy to admit that his premise is rejected by the defenders of the six options, he then has to show how he differs from the non-starters. If he shows that he differs from them by accepting that ethical theory starts from our attraction to primary natural advantages, the objector will point to the theories of the six options which share that assumption, and point out to the Stoic that he also defends a position about virtue and happiness which those theories reject. How then can he defend the divergence?

The strategy of Book IV is to show that Stoic ethics is an outlier with respect to the six options, and that this is a weakness, even if the Stoics themselves try to represent it as a strength. For the Stoic theory shares with the six options the weaker naturalistic position that an ethical theory begins from our attraction to primary natural advantages. This is what makes it a starter rather than a non-starter. However it, unlike the six options, rejects the stronger claim that the primary natural advantages also form part of our final end as developed rational beings. We are thus forced to focus on this point at which the Stoic theory diverges from all the others. This argumentative strategy, then, forces it to isolate itself as an outlier.

Whatever we ourselves think of the dialectic of Books III and IV of *De finibus* we can see how a classification that produced the six options as a set could figure in both pro- and anti-Stoic argument. A set of different and mutually opposing theories nevertheless share a common assumption which only the Stoics deny. The Stoics are forced to defend their theory in a way which defends their divergence from the set of six options, without falling into the camp of the non-starters. Stoic theory is isolated by this focus on one of its most difficult features: the claim that rational development involves a radical re-evaluation of everything that we have hitherto been attracted to, while still regarding that attraction



as natural. Cato presents this as a point of strength; Cicero, as a point of weakness.

We find the classification in *De finibus* II 31-43, where it is used against Epicurus. Cicero gives a short account of Epicurus' version of *oikeiosis*, only to criticize it as failing to do justice to human nature, which strives not towards pleasure but rather towards the development of our powers, physical and also mental. This latter, more adequate, account of human development is the basis for theories of good and evil. Here Carneades' classification is introduced to specify the options. The passage is complicated by a lacuna in 34, but the upshot is clear in 35: there are four theories with simple ends, the Stoics and the three theories whose ends do not include morality – Aristippus or Epicurus, whose end is pleasure, Hieronymus whose end is freedom from pain, and “Carneades”, whose end is primary natural advantages. The three complex ends are ascribed to Callipho, Diodorus and Polemo (the latter also ascribed to Aristotle, the “Old Academy” and the Peripatetics). The non-starters are also mentioned, only to be dismissed.

The classification is used to argue against Epicurus in two ways. Firstly, it is briefly claimed at 35 that Epicurus alone is inconsistent in a way that all the other theories escape<sup>20</sup>. Their starting-points are consistent with their developed final ends, whereas Epicurus begins by calling pleasure the primary object of attraction, with Aristippus, but by the time he gets to his final end is in fact talking about freedom from pain, with Hieronymus. This brief claim here is based on the arguments earlier in the book, from 8-20, mentioned briefly again at 32. The criticism certainly focusses on a problematic point in Epicurus' theory, though we might note that a classification which takes pleasure and freedom from pain to be distinct ends has already positioned Epicurus in a problematic

<sup>20</sup> 35: *Reliqui sibi constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent.*

way. What is interesting here from the present point of view is that, although the claim is illustrated only by Aristippus, Hieronymus and “Carneades”, all the other theories are said to have developed final ends which are consistent with their starting-points. Here the Stoics are taken to belong among the theories which are consistent on this point. Yet in the passage in *De finibus* IV where the classification occurs it is just this which is the disputed point.

Is this a problem? Not if the classification is being used in sceptical argument, where the enquirer can argue from different positions, depending on the theory being attacked. In *De finibus* IV Cicero is arguing against the Stoics; here he is arguing against Epicurus. It is not surprising that the position presupposed is different in each case. To argue against the Stoics Cicero explicitly assumes the position of the “Old Academy”. To argue against Epicurus he presupposes something weaker and less specific, namely the view that the human good must include the development of our mental no less than our physical capacities. Cicero does not need to argue from a stronger position at this point, because the structure of the classification itself shows that Epicurus' theory wavers between two versions of our final end – given, of course, the earlier arguments which show that Epicurus is in fact committed to both.

The assumption Cicero does make, however, proves strong enough to be the basis of a second anti-Epicurean argument which uses the classification. Cicero claims in 36-8 that questions about our final end can be decided only by reason, which rejects any final end which either gives no place to morality, or contains pleasure or freedom from pain, a procedure which leaves standing only the Stoic and “Old Academy” theories. Cicero comments that this result would be clearer if it could be established whether the difference between these two theories is real or merely verbal.

This is followed by an appeal to reason as the ground for

dismissing, first the simple ends of Aristippus, Hieronymus and "Carneades", and then the combined ends which include pleasure or freedom from pain. The non-starters are then mentioned only to be dismissed, as are the Academics (43). But the result this time is declared to be a contest between Epicurus, as the defender of pleasure (albeit in a confused version) and virtue. At 44 Cicero appeals to Chrysippus as declaring that the entire dispute about final ends depends on the contest between pleasure and virtue. Cicero does not in fact identify the claims of virtue as those of the Stoics, resting with a weaker and more widely shared conception of virtue (45). Still, his subsequent arguments against Epicurus are structured by the idea that widely shared views about virtue can be assumed in order to show that Epicurus' views about pleasure as our final end get into systematic trouble, and can be shown to be untenable.

Thus Cicero's use of the Carneadean classification here, together with assumptions, taken to be widely shared, about reason and virtue, leads in two argumentative directions, which are taken to be complementary. One eliminates all theories except those of the Stoa and the "Old Academy", allowing that there is dispute as to whether these are interestingly different theories or mere verbal variants on a single theory. The other reduces all disputes between ethical theories to a dispute between virtue and pleasure, appealing to the original example of Chrysippus, whom we know to have performed a version of this reduction. In *De finibus* II Cicero ranges himself on the side of virtue and argues from this in various ways against the claims of pleasure to be our final end.

The mention of Chrysippus brings to mind a similar stretch of argument at the end of the *Lucullus*<sup>21</sup>. At 129 ff.

<sup>21</sup> C. Lévy and K. Algra have discussed the relation of Chrysippus' classification of ethical theories to that of Carneades. In this paper I am not taking a stand on that relationship. I think it reasonable, however,

we find Carneades' classification at the start of the section of the dialogue devoted to showing that ethical theories are in chronic and hopeless conflict. The classification is introduced in the context of our need to establish a theory of our final end while faced by the difficulty of doing so in the face of disagreement (*dissensio*) among the *summi viri*, the outstanding proponents of ethical theories<sup>22</sup>. The classification is followed by two avowedly unsuccessful attempts by Cicero to find grounds for committing himself to one of the theories. In 132-7, after rejecting the idea that he can just pick a theory without giving good grounds for this, he famously presents himself as torn between the Stoic and the "Old Academy" theories. No argument is given here for the selection of just these two, as there is in *De finibus* II 38, but there is a fairly obvious background assumption that these are the two strongest theories, the ones with most appeal to the thoughtful person who has worked through the grounds for and against all the options offered. Here, instead of leaving it open, as at *De finibus* III 38, whether the two theories converge, with merely verbal differences, Cicero argues that they systematically diverge and are thus mutually exclusive. Hence, in the absence of decisive reasons for preferring one theory to the other, Cicero is left with no reason to commit himself to any of the theories in the classification.

At 138 we turn to another approach to the problem of commitment to an ethical theory, that of Chrysippus, who reduces all tenable ethical ends to the three options of virtue, pleasure and their combination; the elimination of this third

to regard Carneades as unsympathetic to the Stoics in the way his classification is structured, since their theory is bound to be located as an outlier to the six options (whatever we think of the larger form of the classification in the *de fin.* v passage).

<sup>22</sup> More schools than usual are grouped with the non-starters, and the six options are grouped by primary end (either alone or in combination with virtue) and followed by the Stoics.

in turn leaves us with only virtue and pleasure. Whereas Chrysippus himself argued vigorously on the side of virtue against pleasure, Cicero here holds that the claims of pleasure leave him still unable to commit himself to any theory.

In both these passages we find Carneades' classification used to introduce a range of theories which are then reduced to two simple oppositions: either the Stoa versus the "Old Academy" or, with Chrysippus, virtue versus pleasure. In the *De finibus* passage Cicero then ranges himself on the side of virtue in order to use the arguments this provides against Epicurus; in the *Lucullus* he argues that the availability of arguments on both sides leaves him unable to commit himself to either. In the *De finibus* passage he leaves the Stoa-"Old Academy" debate unresolved, leaving open the possibility that there might not even be a real debate between them. Thus the elimination of Epicurus' theory leaves open the debate between Stoics and "Old Academy" which occupies *De finibus* III-v; the second book eliminates pleasure as a final end but leaves open the possibility of commitment to one of the two major theories, a possibility not removed until the end of book v. In the *Lucullus* passage, on the other hand, the debate between Stoa and "Old Academy" is taken to be as inconclusive as that between virtue and pleasure. Neither way of reducing the options offered by Carneades' classification offers us a way to commit ourselves to any one of the theories; hence neither of these reductions help us to overcome the problem posed at the outset by the fact of disagreement about the theories.

The two works thus display very clearly the point that Carneades' classification can be put to very different argumentative purposes. Taken with an assumption that reason is a crucial factor in a good human life it leads to a reduction of the options to those of the Stoa and the "Old Academy", and these two can in turn be argued to be either convergent or mutually conflicting. It can also be reduced to Chrysippus'

simpler classification of virtue versus pleasure; again, this can be put to work against Epicurus on the basis of assumptions about virtue, or can be argued to be an inconclusive debate on the grounds that both sides have powerful arguments. The classification figures in argument which can be used to reach different conclusions from very different ethical starting-points.

In *Tusculanae Disputationes* v 83 Cicero, arguing as an Academic, gives a general argument that virtue can be shown to be sufficient for happiness whatever the conflicting philosophical positions about happiness. This, he says, is to be presented in a friendly way, in contrast to Carneades' use of it against the Stoics. The move is a puzzling one. How can Carneades have made an *anti*-Stoic use of the claim that other philosophical schools agree with the Stoic position? And what exactly does Cicero himself have in mind in claiming that other views converge with the Stoic one?

We begin with the classification, and find the usual theories: first the three primary ends plus the Stoic theory, grouped together as simple; then the three combined ends, which bring in morality. The non-starters are dismissed as usual. The Stoic view has already been put, and Cicero goes through the six options, claiming that each of them can consistently hold that virtue is sufficient for happiness. The "Old Academy", he claims, give so much importance to virtue that they do in fact hold that it is sufficient for happiness (87)<sup>23</sup>. Calliphon and Diodorus both hold that the morality component of happiness leaves the other component way behind. Even the defenders of the primary ends think that the mind is the judge of good and bad, and so distinguishes real from apparent evil. To show that this will get us to the sufficiency

<sup>23</sup> With the exception of Theophrastus (85), whose denial of this thesis was presumably so definite and well-known that he could not plausibly be recruited for it.

of virtue for happiness, Epicurus' happiness on his painful deathbed is adduced, and the following sections develop Epicurean self-sufficiency in the face of want and pain, with many further examples brought in. The rest of the book develops more wide-ranging thoughts about the inadequacy of various conventional evils to destroy happiness.

The final passage is eloquent; but the actual argument is brief, papers over differences between different theories and at points is in obvious tension with what Cicero has argued earlier in the book. The "Old Academy" are said actually to hold that virtue takes happiness even into Phalaris' bull (87), the very conclusion they were at 75 rebuked for rejecting and urged to adopt. Epicurus' dying words are treated with respect (88) whereas at 73-4 they were derided as utterly inadequate to the problem.

The difference is made by appeal to the role of virtue in the combined ends, and reason in the simple ends. In both cases it is notable that the conclusion drawn goes far beyond what the actual proponents of the theory held. The "Old Academy", for example, thought that the role of virtue was such that it was *not* enough to preserve happiness in Phalaris' bull. Calliphon and Diodorus here are represented as holding that virtue is far more important than the other component of happiness; but among the sparse independent information that we have about Calliphon at any rate is the point that he held virtue and pleasure to be *equal* components of happiness<sup>24</sup>. As for the three simple primary ends, we found it stressed in the *De finibus* II passage that these are established on the basis of sense-experience and not reason, and Book V presents them as ends whose appeal is prior to the reflective reason which comes to understand morality. On what basis are they presented here in such a way that the role of reason

<sup>24</sup> Clem., *str.* II 21, 16-9, [Archytas] 58-65.

and morality in them is expanded beyond what we find elsewhere?

Clearly, to get the conclusions he is aiming at, Cicero is interpreting the six options on the basis of stronger assumptions about reason and virtue than can reasonably be ascribed to the actual proponents. Most hedonists, for example, could allow that the mind can distinguish real from apparent good (87) without going on to despise merely apparent goods, still less to regard pain, death and the like as merely apparent goods. In the case of the combined ends, Calliphon held that we come to appreciate virtue first instrumentally and then as having value in its own right, without this leading us to give priority to virtue<sup>25</sup>. Obviously Cicero is making assumptions about reason and virtue which were not shared by the proponents of the actual theories, and which, when used to interpret them, lead to what could be regarded as misrepresentation. What is the point of importing such strong assumptions?

Here we can only speculate; but it is interesting to notice that elsewhere we find a rather different result when the six options are discussed in a way that starts from a strong conception of reason. In the *De finibus* II passage we find at 37 that the options offered by Carneades' classification are to be judged by reason, assisted by wisdom, and by "the virtues, which reason puts in charge of every domain"<sup>26</sup>. Reason eliminates all the simple ends and the combined ends which include pleasure and freedom from pain. In *De finibus* V 21-2 the simple ends and the combined ends with pleasure and freedom from pain are similarly rejected. In the *Lucullus* passage we find explicitly Stoic argument to this effect. Cicero

<sup>25</sup> Clem., *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> 37: *Aequam igitur pronuntiabit sententiam ratio, adhibita primum divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia, quae potest appellari rite sapientia, deinde adiunctis virtutibus, quas ratio rerum omnium dominas esse voluisti.*

takes over the Chrysippean reasoning which eliminates all ends but virtue, pleasure and their combination, and although most of the arguments do not seem very developed<sup>27</sup> we find that *recta ratio* rejects the combination of virtue and pleasure as our end on the grounds that this is like combining a human being with a beast.

All these passages stand in rather sharp contrast with the claims in *Tusculanae Disputationes* v that what reason actually does is to enlarge our understanding of the simple ends, and expand the role of virtue in the combined ends. What this amounts to is that reasons can be given, of the sort Cicero provides, for taking the proponents of the different theories to have conceptions of their ends which in fact converge with the Stoic claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness. The Peripatetics and "Old Academy", for example, are cited as extolling to the heavens the dignity and greatness of virtue, in a way that can be taken to imply that they in fact regard everything but virtue as being of no account. Calliphon and Diodorus are cited for praising virtue so warmly that they implicitly downgrade other factors. Epicurus and other defenders of the primary ends are cited as giving importance to the mind rather than the body in a way which implicitly leads them to conclude that nothing but virtue matters. In all these cases it is claimed that once we judge by reason, all these theories can reasonably be interpreted in a way that leads to convergence with the Stoic view. This is done in a way which goes far beyond, and actually conflicts with, what the defenders of these theories explicitly said themselves.

We can explain the situation in this passage if we take Carneades to have argued that if we start by insisting that

<sup>27</sup> He claims that those who favour freedom from pain, or combine it or primary natural advantages with virtue, are just avoiding the "unpopular" word *pleasure*. See K. ALGRA, *Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero*, cit., pp. 111-5 for this way of arguing in Chrysippus.

reason is a crucial factor in a good human life, and thus in our final end, we need not be led thereby to reject the simple ends, or the combination of virtue with pleasure or freedom from pain. Rather, reason may be given a role in the simple ends which enlarges our understanding of them, and a role in the combined ends which shows how virtue dominates the other component, in something like the above way. Thus, rather than reason eliminating ends in which it does not appear to dominate, it can be used differently, to explicate those ends in way leading to convergence. This procedure, of course, manifestly goes against the intentions of the original theorists. Carneades could, however, support it by making use of explicit statements by Epicurus, endorsing what look like Stoic conclusions<sup>28</sup>.

Such a procedure is anti-Stoic only if combined with claims that the Stoics themselves use the same conception of reason to argue *against* other theories; for in this case the sceptic can use the Stoics' own approach to demonstrate agreement as opposed to the disagreement they claim, and to come to conclusions which are the opposite of theirs on the basis of the same appeal to reason. On its own, however, this appeal to reason can be used, as it is by Cicero, in a way which is positive and irenic (though contrary to the stated intentions of the actual theorists).

This is, of course, speculation; some account, however, is required which takes in all these passages and shows how Cicero could have used a Carneadean argument to a different end from Carneades himself.

What we have seen so far is the use of Carneades' classi-

<sup>28</sup> Seneca frequently uses this kind of statement by Epicurus to claim convergence with the Stoics, in a more friendly way. We do not know who could have been a Carneadean source for the view that the Peripatetics could be interpreted as converging with the Stoics; Cicero, of course, can make good use here of Antiochus.

fication in arguments that do one of three things. It can be used, as it is in *De finibus* III-IV, to show that, given an assumption that six of the theories share, the seventh can be shown to be, by that very fact, isolated; this can be presented as an advantage or a disadvantage. Or, it can be used, as it is in *De finibus* II and *Lucullus*, to simplify serious ethical debate by reducing it to two conflicts; again, in either case arguments can be put forward against one theory from the perspective of the other, or arguments on both sides can be shown to leave no winner. Or it can be used, as in *Tusculanae Disputationes* V, in an argument which shows that the six options converge with Stoicism, which is perhaps part of an argument to embarrass the Stoics by showing that this conclusion is reached from the same assumptions from which the Stoics argue that the six options diverge from Stoicism. We can see how Carneades might have used the classification in arguments like these, without committing himself to the truth of any of the theories from which he argued. (Or, of course, this might be characteristic of Cicero's own uses of the classification.) These uses can reasonably be seen as sceptical uses of argument; we find the classification in arguments against different theories from different starting-points, without commitment to any of them.

In *De finibus* V and [Archytas'] *Ethical Education* we find an interestingly different use. In *De finibus* V nine ends are introduced, but the only ones discussed are the usual seven. The three primary ends are rapidly dismissed on the grounds that "any exposition of the supreme good that leaves out morality has no place in its theory for duty, virtue or friendship" (22). Two of the combined ends are dismissed on the grounds that when morality is combined with pleasure or freedom from pain this merely "debases" morality. We have seen this pattern of argument before.

This leaves us with two views, the Stoic and the "Old Academy". Piso, the Antiochean spokesperson, claims that

this is the same, shared position, with merely verbal differences, and argues this for most of book V, until at 75 ff Cicero argues that while this may be the "Old Academy" view it is neither the Peripatetic nor the Stoic one. Five of the six options are thus eliminated, to leave the sixth, virtue and the primary natural advantages, which is developed, but in a form in which it is claimed that it is essentially, if not verbally, the same as the Stoic theory. As we have seen earlier, this claim is one of the major awkward points in this passage, since the Stoic theory was emphatically introduced as having a final end which does not contain a primary end (since it consists in pursuing, even if not achieving, natural advantages) only to be reintroduced as, allegedly, a mere verbal variant on the "Old Academy" end, which is one of the combined ones.

What is different about this passage is that Piso is not using his arguments provisionally; he is not committed to his assumption about reason, for example, merely in order to argue against other theories. Rather, coming from a supporter of Antiochus his reasoning is not sceptical but dogmatic, committing him to the truth of the theory he develops in the book. Carneades' classification is thus used here to eliminate the competitors in a definitive way, and the theory left standing, which the classification has been used to locate, is taken to be more than just a basis for arguing against other theories. Antiochus may well, then, have been innovating in a way illustrated in this passage. But whether or not he is responsible for the additions to the structure of the classification discussed earlier, the *use* of it here seems different from the other uses we find in Cicero. Whether due to Antiochus or not, this way of using the classification puts greater weight on it: if it is not exhaustive then the favoured theory will have been supported only in part<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> Perhaps this is why Piso insists in 16 that Carneades classified all possible theories.

At the end of [Archytas'] *Ethical Education*, one of the pseudo-Pythagorean ethical works, there is a passage<sup>30</sup> which after emphasis on the need for life to have a *telos* says vigorously that those who are defective and foolish in various ways get this wrong.

"People pay the price of folly who allot the highest good to pleasure (*hadona*), and those are punished who honour freedom from pain (*tan analgasian*) before all; and in general those people are choked in an evil storm who leave the happy life in a good state (*eupatheia*)<sup>31</sup> of the body or in the irrational condition of the soul. Not much more fortunate than these are those who indeed exalt the fine (*kalon*), so as to call it valuable, but who hold out as equally valuable to it pleasure

<sup>30</sup> Text in H. THESLEFF, (ed.), *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*, ("Acta Academiae Aboensis Humaniora" xxx, 1), Abo 1965, pp. 40-3; B. CENTRONE, *Pseudopythagorica Ethica: i trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo*, Napoli 1990; S. GIANI, *Pseudo-Archita, L'educazione morale*, introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento, ("Annali dell'istituto universitario orientale di Napoli. Quaderni" 1), Roma 1993. I use Giani's text except where indicated. On the pseudo-Pythagorean ethical writings see also H. THESLEFF, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period*, ("Acta Academiae Aboensis Humaniora" xxiv, 3), Abo 1961; W. BURKERT, *Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung einiger Pseudopythagorica, Pseudepigrapha I*, ("Fondation Hardt Entretiens" xviii), Genève 1971; P. MORAUX, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. II, Berlin, New York 1984. I take no stand here on the disputed issue of the date or dates for these writings beyond the obvious point that the date for *Ethical Education* has to be consistent with its use of Carneades' classification. It is possible that it and similar works have much in common with Middle Platonic works, as is argued by Giani, following Moraux, but a decision on this does not affect the thesis of the present paper.

<sup>31</sup> This is not the only occurrence in this work of a Stoic term in a non-Stoic usage; the work is strongly anti-Stoic, denouncing *apatheia* and the sufficiency of virtue for happiness as well as putting forward a positive position.

and freedom from pain and the primary good states and natural and irrational impulses of either body or soul<sup>32</sup>. They do wrong in both ways. On one side, they drag down the loftiness of the soul and its actions to equality with the perfection of the body. On the other side they set up bodily well-being to the same height as pleasure of the soul. But nature and the divine resent the mixture<sup>33</sup> of these things, for they do not preserve the value of the superior with regard to the inferior. But *we* say that the body is the tool of the soul, and that mind is the leader of the rest of the soul and its vessel, and that natural good fortune (*eutuchia*) is instrumental to intellectual activity (*tai noeraí energeiai*)<sup>34</sup>, if it is complete in power and time and in equipment (*choragia*)".

Clearly we have Carneades' classification here, but there are some important unclaritys. We have the primary ends pleasure and freedom from pain, and the ends which combine these with virtue. But where we expect "Carneades" and the option usually assigned to the "Old Academy" we find phrases which are difficult to take as referring to primary natural advantages, despite finding the terms "primary" and "natu-

<sup>32</sup> *Tan hedonan kai tan analgasian kai tas eupatheias tas protas kai phusikas kai alogos hormas e somatos e psuchas*. Giani *ad loc.* discusses various renderings of this passage. She punctuates after *eupatheias*, translating as "il piacere e l'assenza di dolore ed il benessere, i primi impulsi naturali ed irrazionali o del corpo o dell'anima". Centrone renders, "il piacere, l'insensibilità al dolore, le buone passioni primarie, gli impulsi naturali e irrazionali o del corpo e dell'anima." Gretchen Reydam-Schils has made the interesting suggestion to me that we may have Stoic notions here being reclaimed for a predominantly Platonist psychology (if so, this would suggest a late date for the text).

<sup>33</sup> Giani *ad loc.* defends the manuscript reading *diakrisei*, "judgement", against earlier conjectures and Thesleff's *diakrasei*, accepted by Centrone, which I also accept.

<sup>34</sup> Earlier in the same extract (lines 18-9 in Giani) the author says *gegonames pot'energeian noeran, han kaleomes praxin*.

ral" where we expect the sixth option. We find the term *eupatheia*, used in a way which is obviously non-Stoic, picking out a good physical state of the person. Unsurprisingly, recent interpreters like Centrone and Giani have taken the view that we do not find the usual third and sixth options in Carneades' classification here at all. Rather, the third option is replaced by a generalization about the first two; pleasure and freedom from pain are nothing more than good states of the body or the soul which are irrational. The sixth option is replaced by a similar repetition: pleasure and freedom from pain are summed up (with exegetic *kai*) as primary good states, and as being natural and irrational impulses of body and soul. This result is puzzling in many ways, particularly the reference to impulses<sup>35</sup>. Still, it seems safer to allow that the third and sixth options in the standard Carneadean account have been replaced, rather than to insist that our text refers to the primary natural advantages.

There may be a reason for the elision of these options in the final lines, where [Archytas] argues for an alternative; for the preferred theory is one which specifies our *telos* as virtuous activity together with external prosperity; the treatise has insisted earlier that virtue is not sufficient in itself for happiness. The preferred theory thus fits the usual sixth Carneadean option, which cannot then be presented as an option to be rejected. This is a theory of an Aristotelian kind<sup>36</sup>. It holds that virtue is sufficient for not being unhappy, although it needs good fortune in addition for happiness; vice, on the other hand, is sufficient for unhappiness. This position concedes more to the power of virtue than the more Theophras-

<sup>35</sup> I am not persuaded by Giani's note *ad loc.*, which argues that there is a reference here to the Epicurean account of *oikeiosis*.

<sup>36</sup> As is stressed by P. MORAUX, *Der Aristotelismus*, cit., and G. MAGNALDI, *L' "oikeiosis" peripatetica*, cit., who stress points of coincidence with Arius Didymus' account of Aristotelian ethics.

tean line of *The good and happy man*, also ascribed to [Archytas], which holds flatly that ill-fortune can render the virtuous person unhappy<sup>37</sup>. The rejection of the combined ends in *Ethical Education* also rests on the claimed appropriateness of the "better" predominating over the "worse". This is a regular theme of the pseudo-Pythagorean writings, but it also fits with Antiochus' kind of appeal to the power of virtue to outweigh external goods.

In allowing that ill-fortune cannot make the virtuous person unhappy, while also holding that the virtuous person in good fortune is happy in a way in which the virtuous person in ill-fortune is not, [Archytas'] position is in the same area as that of Antiochus in *De finibus* v. It is interesting that both of them introduce a theory of this type by way of a review of Carneades' classification which rejects the other options within that classification, and which regards that rejection as establishing the preferred theory in a committed rather than provisional way. In both cases it can reasonably be argued that the process of elimination is somewhat clumsy. Antiochus presents his sixth option in a way which claims that it is essentially the same as the Stoic theory, which stands outside the six options. (Earlier we noted the awkwardness of this.) [Archytas] rejects four options only to defend a theory which is rather like that of Antiochus, although [Archytas] combines it with another theory which likewise falls outside Carneades' six options. In [Archytas'] case this theory is Platonism, for the basically Aristotelian ideas of the pseudo-Pythagorean ethical treatises show considerable reinterpretation in Platonic terms. The last few lines of *Ethical Education*, for example, while insisting in good Aristotelian fashion that external prosperity is required for happiness, insist at the same time that the soul uses the body as its tool, and that mind

<sup>37</sup> Text in H. THESLEFF, *The Pythagorean Texts*, cit., pp. 8-15; B. CENTRONE, *Pseudopythagorica Ethica*, cit.



is the crucial part of the soul, ideas which recall the end of Plato's *Alcibiades*<sup>38</sup>. (This might go some way towards explaining the reworking of the third and sixth options, for both of these reworked options mention a good state of the body and soul, treating them explicitly on a par, whereas the preferred theory sharply rejects parity of treatment, privileging the role of the mind and the soul in our final end).

The pseudo-Pythagorean ethical writings combine a basically Aristotelian framework for thinking about virtue and happiness with a Platonizing tendency to exalt the mind and downgrade the body and externals. Why this Platonic-Aristotelian combination should have been presented as Pythagorean is a puzzle to which I have nothing to contribute. I merely want to point out here that [Archytas] is using Carneades' classification in a way comparable to that of Antiochus. [Archytas] eliminates the options he considers, and defends his own view, a Platonic-Aristotelian hybrid, as an improvement on them. This is rather like the way Antiochus eliminates all but his sixth option only to conflate it with the Stoic theory to produce a Stoic-Aristotelian hybrid as an improvement on the original six options. In both cases Carneades' classification is being used to produce, by elimination, a favoured theory. In both cases this theory can be said to build on the sixth option, for both theories are Aristotelian, but in both cases the theory has to be transformed, in Antiochus' case by Stoicizing it, in [Archytas'] case by Platonizing it. In both cases the relation to Carneades' classification is somewhat awkward. And in neither case is the elimination of theories other than the favoured one part of sceptical argument.

[Archytas] is not a sophisticated philosopher like Antio-

<sup>38</sup> See S. GIANI, *Pseudo-Archita*, cit., pp. 32-4, for elements in the treatise relating to Platonism. (Use of Carneades' classification itself may be due to Platonic tradition incorporating Academic elements).

chus. However, what happens in *Ethical Education* is interesting. [Archytas] finds it useful to present his favoured Platonic-Aristotelian theory as the winner by elimination, where the eliminated options are a selection from Carneades' classification. The favoured theory retains the strong naturalist assumption that lies behind that classification, namely that primary natural advantages are not just the starting-point for our ethical development but form part of our final good as developed rational beings. However, the Platonic insistence that the soul rules the body (not to mention the characterization of action as "intellectual activity") sits uneasily with this kind of naturalism.

Platonists who put forward *homoiosis theoi* as the Platonic understanding of our final end took a simpler and more consistent course. A straightforwardly Plato-inspired approach to ethical thinking has little use for the whole Hellenistic project of looking for the beginnings of ethical theory in our initial attractions to and repulsions from what is natural for us. For a Platonist ordinary ethical claims are full of error, and ordinary moral education lands us only in the Cave, from which we have to be saved by a painful conversion to the truth which leaves our original conventional views behind<sup>39</sup>.

Later Platonists and Christians, who utterly reject the naturalist assumptions linking the theories in Carneades' classification do not, understandably, find the same use for it as theorists who accept them, or who, like [Archytas], try to build out from them. In some of these thinkers the classification represents an alternative approach to ethics to be rejected. Augustine, in Book XIX of the *City of God*, spends some time organizing the views of pagan philosophers on our

<sup>39</sup> The relationship of Platonist to Stoic ethical thinking remains complex. Thinkers like Philo and Maximus of Tyre find considerable convergence between the theories, in a way which allows them to shed what they find unacceptable in Stoic naturalism.

final good according to the schemata of Varro, Antiochus' pupil. We find in the first three chapters a classification clearly derivative from the Carneadean one, with four primary ends, namely pleasure, freedom from pain, their combination and primary natural advantages (*primigenia*). Each of these can be linked in one of three ways with virtue, being dominated by virtue, equal to it or serving it, giving twelve theories in all<sup>40</sup>. They are all, however, eliminated except the option of primary natural advantages dominated by virtue, a position identified with that of the "Old Academy", Augustine agreeing with Varro's argument that the other three primary ends are not really distinct from primary natural advantages, and that the dominance of soul over body supports the idea that the best life is one in which virtue is dominant, but with the use of primary natural advantages. Augustine works out what he presumably takes to be the most defensible theory among the pagan philosophers only to reject it, in the rest of the book, in favour of the Christian view that happiness is to be found only in a further life, not this one, and that no worldly goods can be relied on for any part of happiness. Varro's classification is used only to bring into focus, in what seems to be its most defensible form, the kind of theory which Augustine holds must be completely rejected<sup>41</sup>.

Similarly, in book II of Ambrose's *De officiis*, a work intended to form a Christian counterpart to and replacement

<sup>40</sup> Rather pointlessly Augustine retails from Varro various ways of multiplying the number of theories, only to agree that these are irrelevant to consideration of our final ends.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. also Book VIII 8, where Augustine rejects a variety of pagan views as to our final good in favour of the Christian view that it is enjoyment of God, finding Plato the pagan philosopher most akin to Christian views precisely because of his conception of God, which Augustine takes to prefigure monotheism. In the early *De beata vita* Augustine defends a view of our final end which owes more to Stoicism, something for which he criticizes himself in his later *Retractations*.

of Cicero's work, Ambrose comments that the pagan "happy life" (*beata vita*) is to be replaced by the Christian "eternal life" (*aeterna vita*) focussed on salvation in the life to come. It is presented as an alternative to pagan views of our final end, in a passage which brings in Carneades' original classification, rather than Varro's, to show us a list of rejected alternatives.

"The philosophers, of course, have given all manner of answers to the question of what makes for a happy life. Some, like Hieronymus, have said that it is a matter of being free from pain. Others have said it is to be found in the knowledge of things. Herillus, for example, took this position: finding that knowledge was praised to the heights by Aristotle and Theophrastus, he maintained that this, and only this, was the supreme good – despite the fact that those men had esteemed it simply as a good, not as *the only* good. Others, such as Epicurus, have said that happiness consists in pleasure; still others, men like Callipho, and Diodorus after him, understood it to involve a combination of honourable conduct and something else as well – one said pleasure, the other, freedom from pain – both of them being convinced that a person's life cannot be happy unless he behaves in an honourable fashion. Zeno the Stoic said that the supreme good, the only good, is to do what is honourable, while Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the other Peripatetics argued that though a happy life undoubtedly consists in virtue, or in behaviour that is honourable, its happiness is nevertheless made complete by the addition of bodily and external advantages. Divine Scripture, however, has specified that eternal life is to be found in knowledge of the divine, and in the fruit of good works...."<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Ambros. *de off.* II 4-5, translation by I.J. DAVIDSON, Oxford 2001.

Ambrose is drawing on a passage in *De finibus* v<sup>43</sup> where Piso claims that the “Old Academy” theory he has just expounded gives the most satisfactory and complete account of our final end, whereas other ethical theories overemphasized parts of this. The classification is used to bring together theories which are taken to share the assumptions of the “Old Academy” theory but do a less satisfactory job. In Ambrose, however, the classification serves rather to show off the preferred theory by contrast with a set of options rejected because they all share assumptions utterly spurned by his preferred theory. As a roll-call of rejected options the classification is here serving merely as a list. And it is significant that even before we get to Ambrose we find the classification in doxographical lists like those of Arius Didymus and Clement, where it figures merely as a set of obscure and undefended views alongside more famous ones<sup>44</sup>.

If we look at later Platonic and Christian theories in relation to the original classification, they seem at first to have most in common with the non-starters, the theories which refuse to base themselves on our primary natural attractions and repulsions. But the later Platonic and Christian theories reject naturalism in a far more thorough way than Ariston and Erillus were ever taken to do. They reject the idea that our initial natural attractions and repulsions are the right place to look when we are investigating our final end, and this is part of a radical rejection of human nature as a basis for ethical theory. We should, we are told, be looking somewhere else entirely, at a transcendental realm to which the soul can flee, or at the guidance of divine scripture. At this point the set of theories consisting of Stoicism plus the six options ceases to mark out a classification useful for argument. When this hap-

<sup>43</sup> *De fin.* v 72-4; Ambrose's main Ciceronian model is the *De officiis*, but he follows it very loosely and draws on many other sources.

<sup>44</sup> *Clem. str.* II 21, *Ar. Did. apud Stob. ecl.* II 47, 12-48, 5.

pens, its use in sceptical argument disappears. The classification dwindles into a list, and since, as a list, it contains mostly obscure philosophers, it dwindles further, turning up, as in Clement, as a part of larger, more comprehensive lists whose purpose is to include major theories. So the names of Calliphon, Diodorus and the others, taken out of Carneades' theoretical setting but without much information about their views, survive alongside more famous ones, Carneades' purpose forgotten<sup>45</sup>.

<sup>45</sup> I am grateful for comments from Gisela Striker, Gretchen Reydams-Schils, Jonathan Barnes and Brad Inwood, and discussion at La Sapienza.